Another Peace Deal, Another Test: Will the DRC–Rwanda Agreement Break the Cycle?

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On December 20, 2025, only weeks after a new peace agreement, the Washington Accords, between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda was signed, the U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio described the deal as something new: a baseline that could be enforced. For the first time, the United States positioned itself as the central broker of a formal peace framework between the two countries, signaling a deeper diplomatic and strategic investment in the region.

On paper, the agreement looks familiar. The DRC committed to dismantling the FDLR—formerly known as the Ex-FAR and the Interahamwe—a militia group tied to perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. But this commitment is not new. The DRC made similar promises more than two decades ago under earlier peace frameworks, including arrangements tied to the 2002 Pretoria process. In 2009, Rwandan troops were even authorized to enter eastern Congo to help dismantle the FDLR — a moment that many believed could finally resolve the issue. It did not.

Today, the same commitment is being made again. The question is unavoidable: if these promises were not fulfilled before, why should anyone believe they will be fulfilled now?

The Problem of Ambiguity

One of the agreement’s most troubling weaknesses is Rwanda’s commitment to lift what are described as “defensive measures.” The agreement does not clearly define what those measures are. This is not a technical oversight. It is a structural flaw.

Peace agreements only work when obligations are measurable and enforceable. If “defensive measures” remain undefined, compliance becomes subjective. One side can claim it has complied while the other insists it has not. Enforcement becomes political theater rather than a rules-based process.

From the Congolese perspective, lifting defensive measures should logically mean the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the end of support to armed groups operating in eastern Congo. But if the agreement never clearly states this, how can violations be proven? How can consequences be triggered? You cannot enforce what you cannot define.

A Constraint on Deterrence

The agreement also creates a dangerous strategic imbalance. Any direct military action by the DRC against Rwanda could constitute a violation of the agreement. While ceasefire logic is understandable, it risks constraining the DRC’s ability to deter or respond to perceived threats. In a region defined by mistrust and proxy warfare, limiting deterrence without simultaneously removing threats creates instability, not peace.

Warning Signs Came Early

If this agreement was meant to signal a new era, reality quickly pushed back. Fighting resumed within weeks. The capture of strategic areas such as Uvira underscored how fragile the framework is. Instead of demonstrating a durable ceasefire, events suggested that the agreement may be another temporary pause in a long-running conflict.

This is not unprecedented. History shows that peace agreements in the Great Lakes region often reduce violence temporarily but fail to eliminate its root causes.

The Illusion of Newness

There have been multiple agreements that produced moments of relative calm, including:

• The 1999 Lusaka Agreement

• The 2002 Global and Inclusive Agreement

• The March 23, 2009 Agreement

• The 2013 Addis Ababa Framework

None produced lasting peace. Recent regional diplomatic processes — including the Nairobi and Luanda tracks — have also struggled to produce sustainable outcomes. Each agreement was introduced as a turning point. Each was eventually overtaken by events on the ground.

The Real Question

Supporters of the current deal argue that this time is different because the United States is directly involved and because economic incentives — including mineral supply chains and regional investment — are now tied to peace. But peace cannot be outsourced to diplomacy or markets alone. If armed groups remain active, if security guarantees remain ambiguous, and if accountability mechanisms remain weak, then peace agreements risk becoming recurring diplomatic rituals rather than real turning points.

When History Repeats

Karl Marx wrote that history repeats itself — first as tragedy, then as farce. In eastern Congo, repetition is not theoretical. It is lived reality. Communities have seen agreement after agreement announced with optimism, only to watch violence return. The danger is not just renewed conflict. The danger is erosion of belief — belief in diplomacy, belief in international mediation, and belief that peace agreements can actually deliver peace. The world may see each new agreement as progress. But for people living in eastern Congo, the question is simpler and more urgent: Will this agreement finally break the cycle — or will it simply become the next chapter in it?